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RECOVERY BY FEDERAL PRISONERS UNDER
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
FRANK J. WooDy*
May a federal prisoner, who has been injured due to the negligence
of a federal employee while incarcerated in a federal prison, recover
from the United States under the Federal Torts Claims Act?' The act
provides for district court jurisdiction over:
[C]laims against the United States ... for injury or loss of property,
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission oc-
curred2 . . . [and that] the United States shall be liable . . . in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances .... 
Whether a federal prisoner may recover under the act depends upon
the interpretation given this language, since no express exception pre-
cludes application of the act.4
APPLICABLE FEDERAL CASES
At the time of this writing, this question has not yet been before
the United States Supreme Court. However, it has been presented to
the courts of appeal for the seventh5 and eighth6 circuits and to var-
ious federal district courts. The circuit court decisions and all but
one of the few reported district court decisions7 denied relief on the
ground that the act was not intended to cover this situation, citing
Feres v. United States' as controlling.
* Member, Washington Bar (1960).
1 The Federal Tort Claims Act was enacted as Title IV of the Legislative Reorgani-
zation Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 842, and the relevant provisions are now found in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1958).
228 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
828 U.S.C. § 2674 (1958).
428 U.S.C. § 2680 (1958).
5 Jones v. United States, 249 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1957).
6 Lack v. United States, 262 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1958).
7 Berman v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 107 (E.D.N.Y. 1959) ; Van Zuch v. United
States, 118 F. Supp. 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1954); Shew v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 1
(M.D.N.C. 1953); Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953).
Lawrence v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Ala. 1961), is the sole case in
which relief has been granted.
8 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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The Feres decision involved a consolidation of three cases, all of
which concerned claims under the act by servicemen or their depend-
ents for injuries sustained while on active duty, allegedly caused by
the negligence of an employee of the Government. In denying relief,
the Supreme Court held that Congress had not intended the act to
cover injuries to servicemen sustained while on active duty.' Diverse
grounds were provided by the Court. One was that the act did not
create new causes of action but rather accepted liability "under cir-
cumstances that would bring private liability into existence,"'01 and
"plaintiffs can point to no liability of a 'private individual' even re-
motely analogous to that which they are asserting against the United
States. [There is] ... no American law which has ever permitted a
soldier to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers or
the Government he is serving."'1 Furthermore, "like circumstances"
means "all the circumstances" and therefore must include the "status
of the wronged and the wrongdoer"' 2 and not just that one was a land-
lord and the other his tenant in one case, and that one was a doctor
and the other his patient in the other cases. Therefore, allowing recov-
ery in this action would cause "novel and unprecedented liabilities"'.3
which was not the purpose of the act. "[N]o private individual has
the power to conscript or mobilize a private army with such authority
over persons as the Government vests in echelons of command."' 4
Another ground provided by the Court was that Congress did not
intend liability to be dependent upon the varying laws of the several
states in this sort of a case, since unlike others, a serviceman has no
choice where he goes, and, therefore, he has no choice as to what laws
shall govern him. Furthermore, the "relationship between the Govern-
ment and members of its armed forces is 'distinctively federal in char-
acter' . . . [and] the scope, nature, legal incidents and consequences
of the relation between persons in the service and the Government are
fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed by federal
authority." 5 Finally, reasoned the Court, statutory relief has already
been provided for servicemen, 6 and the failure of Congress to provide
9 A serviceman may recover under the act if the injury occurred while he was on
leave. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
10 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950).
11 Ibid.
12 Id. at 142.
is Ibid.
1 Id. at 141-42.
'15 Id. at 143-44, quoting from United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
16 Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act of 1940, 54 Stat 1178, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 501-90
(1952).
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for an adjustment in the act is indicative of an intent for the act not
to apply.'
Between 1950 and 1955, three district court decisions were reported
concerning actions under the act by federal prisoners for injuries sus-
tained while incarcerated in federal prisons and caused by the negli-
gence of governmental employees. In all three cases, upon the basis
of the Feres decision, the actions were dismissed for failure to state a
claim.
In the first of these cases, Sigmon v. United States,8 the court ad-
mitted that the act, if broadly construed, would cover this action, but
interpreted the act so as to exclude it. The court said Congress, in pro-
viding relief for prisoners or their dependents for injuries sustained in
prison industry, 9 apparently intended that such relief should be ex-
clusive. A contrary interpretation would result in claims too numerous
and detrimental to penal discipline. Furthermore, allowance of recov-
ery would establish a new and novel procedure. Apparently, the court
was not impressed with the fact that the entire act was extremely novel.
The most important ground, previously set forth by the Feres case, was
that the "like circumstances" test of the act includes consideration of
the relationship between the claimant and the United States. A private
person, declared the court, would not find himself "under like circum-
stances" "because no private individual has the legal right to hold any
other private individual in penal servitude. 2' '  Finally, the act makes
liability depend upon the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred. The proposition that Congress intended the act to apply in
these cases is inconsistent with the fact that Congress had enacted
many statutes for the purpose of establishing a uniform penal system.
It is unlikely that Congress would also intend something which would
disrupt this uniformity.
The reasoning of the Sigmon case was adopted in Skew v. United
States,2' although this was unnecessary to the decision since the court
found, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff's injury was not caused by
the defendant's negligence.
17 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950). An additional ground was that
one of the exceptions in 28 U.S.C. § 2680 might imply exclusion since it excepts "any
claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the
Coast Guard, during time of war." It was also stated that one purpose of the act was
to do away with the plague of private bills in Congress for relief, and since there had
never been a plague of private bills from servicemen, those claims were not intended
to be covered by the act.
18 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953).
1 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1958).
20 Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906, 910 (W.D. Va. 1953).
21116 F. Supp. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1953).
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Subsequently, in Van Zuch v. United States,2 the reasoning of the
Sigmon case was again followed and the Feres decision cited as con-
trolling. Special attention was drawn to the portion of the Feres opin-
ion which stated that Congress did not intend the federal penal system
to be controlled by the laws of the various states in any way. The court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that since the negligence alleged was,
inter alia, failure to provide adequate medical care, the "like circum-
stances" test of the act was satisfied since, as a matter of accepted
substantive law, doctors are liable for injuries caused by their mal-
practice. Just as an individual could not conscript and mobilize a pri-
vate army, countered the court, so also an individual does not have the
power "to imprison a person privately for a crime."" Further, the fed-
eral prisoner-government relationship, like the serviceman-government
relationship, was "distinctively federal in character." The United
States acts as a sovereign in dealing with offenders, which is distin-
guishable from actions such as making contracts and buying and sell-
ing property-conduct capable of being performed by private persons.
The fact that statutory relief has been provided for federal prisoners
in some situations24 provided additional persuasion. However, this
court apparently reserved some doubt as to the validity of its holding,
for it declared at the conclusion of the opinion, that as a matter of law,
proof of negligence had been insufficient.
It would seem that these decisions indicated the expectable treat-
ment to be given such actions in the future, and the federal courts
would continue to restrict the application of the act.2" However, in
two subsequent cases, the Supreme Court indicated a limit to the Feres
case, and possibly a contrary trend in interpreting the act.2" In Indian
Towing Co. v. United States," the Court allowed a barge charterer and
others to recover under the act when a tug towing the barge went
aground due to the negligent operation of a lighthouse by the Coast
Guard. The Court rejected the Government's contention that the "like
circumstances" requirement of the act must be read as excluding lia-
bility for injuries sustained in the performance of activities which pri-
vate persons do not perform-that the United States is not liable for
22118 F. Supp. 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
23 Id. at 472.
24 18 U.S.C. §4126 (1958).
25 See also, Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
26 See Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Proposed Construction of the Dis-
cretionary Function Exception, 31 WAsr. L. REv. 207 (1956) ; Peck, Absolute Liabil-
ity and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 STAr. L. Rlv. 433 (1957).
27 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
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injuries resulting from the negligent performance by its employees of
"uniquely governmental functions." This, declared the Court, would
amount to interpreting the act to read "under the same circumstances"28
while the act states "under like circumstances." "All the circum-
stances," or the "status" of the parties was not deemed material here,
contrary to the reasoning in the Feres case. Rather, reasoned the
Court, just as an individual's conduct which induces reliance by oth-
ers creates a duty on his part, under certain circumstances, to act with
due care regarding those persons, so must employees of the United
States exercise due care when they cause reliance under similar cir-
cumstances, and failure to perform this duty, resulting in injury to the
relying party, should render the United States liable under the act, the
same as an individual.29 Furthermore:
[A]ll Government activity is inescapably 'uniquely governmental' in
that it is performed by the Government .... On the other hand, it is
hard to think of any governmental activity on the 'operational level'
... which is 'uniquely governmental,' in the sense that its kind has
not at one time or another been, or could not conceivably be, privately
performed.30
The Feres case was found to be inapplicable since "without exception,
the relationship of military personnel to the Government has been gov-
erned exclusively by federal law."'"
In 1957, the Court decided in Rayonier, Inc. v. United States2 that
a person whose land had been damaged due to the negligent handling
of a fire by the Forest Service could recover under the act. The Court
said the test of liability of the United States under the act, as laid down
by the Indian Towing Co. case, was "whether a private person would
be responsible for similar negligence under the laws of the State where
the acts occurred.""2 The Court did not indicate whether it was rely-
ing upon the fact that private firefighting organizations do exist, or
28 d. at 61.
29 The Court also rejected the proposed adoption of the "governmental v. non-
governmental functions" theory used to determine liability of municipal corporations
due to the confusion which exists in that body of law.
30 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 67-68 (1955).
31 Id. at 69, quoting from Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
32352 U.S. 315 (1957).
83 Id. at 319. Again the Court rejected adoption of the "governmental v. non-
governmental functions" distinction. The Court admitted "that it is 'novel and un-
precedented' to hold the United States accountable for the negligence of its firefighters,
but the very purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to waive the Government's traditional
all-encompassing immunity from tort actions and to establish novel and unprecedented
governmental liability." The Court apparently declined to assume the responsibility of
protecting the public treasury, and said that if the act is to be altered from its plain
meaning, that would be the job of Congress.
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whether it would be content if the ordinary tort principles of negligence
were satisfied."-
The two circuit court decisions with regard to whether a federal pris-
oner could recover under the act were rendered subsequent to both the
Indian Towing Co. and Rayonier cases. In the first, Jones v. United
States," the seventh circuit, following the Feres case, held an individ-
ual would never be under circumstances like the United States here
since just as a private individual cannot conscript or mobilize a private
army, neither does he have a legal right to hold another individual in
penal servitude.3 The eighth circuit, in Lack v. United States, 7 also
denied relief to a federal prisoner, relying particularly upon the rea-
soning that the federal prisoner-government relationship, like the serv-
iceman-government relationship, is governed exclusively by federal law,
and therefore Congress could not have intended this situation to be
covered by the act. Indian Towing Co. and Rayonier were recognized
as a limitation upon further restriction of the act; however, the court
characterized the situation of the federal prisoner to be more like the
one in the Feres case, since private persons can and do fight forest fires
as a business, and conceivably could be allowed to run lighthouses, while
"it is far less likely that private persons could operate armies or pris-
ons." 8 More significant was the court's note that since the passage of
the act, Congress has passed several private bills to provide relief for
injured federal prisoners, 9 and because these private bills are usually
passed only when the person has no other means to gain relief, it is at
least inferable that Congress now considers the act to exclude this situ-
ation. Of course, it is the intent of Congress at the time of the passage
of the act which is determinative of its meaning, but, considered the
court, this provides at least some evidence of what that intent likely
was. The court further reasoned that since Congress was aware of the
interpretation being given the act by the lower federal courts, it would
subsequently have made its intent clear by legislation if it disagreed.
In 1959, another district court denied relief to a federal prisoner,
34 In both Indianz Towing Co. and Rayonier, Mr. Justice Reed vigorously dissented;
Justices Burton, Minton and Clark concurred with him in Indian Towing Co. and Mr.
Justice Clark concurred with him in Rayonier. Of these dissenters, only Mr. Justice
Clark remains on the bench.
35 249 F2d 864 (7th Cir. 1957).
a1 Id. at 866.
87 262 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1958).
8s Id. at 170.
39 See Act of July 14, 1956, Private Law 773, ch. 615, 70 Stat. A124. With reference
to this bill, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary reported that the bill was advisable
since the prisoner could not recover under the Federal Tort Claims Act, citing the
Sigmon and Vat; Zuch cases. S. REP. No. 1976, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1956).
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deeming the Feres case as controlling." The prisoner was injured while
assigned to a public health hospital for drug addiction treatment under
circumstances which apparently would result in governmental liability
but for his being a federal prisoner. Apparently the court was not fa-
vorably impressed with the fact that the person was injured in a situa-
tion related only incidentally to being a prisoner, since relief was denied
solely because of that status. The absurd appeared to be approaching
rapidly.
When an even tougher case arose, however, the absurd result was
avoided. In Lawrence v. United States,4 a federal prisoner recovered
under the act for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision. At the
time of the accident, the plaintiff was riding on the body of a govern-
ment truck being driven on an air force base by a federal employee
within the scope of his employment. Another passenger, rather than
the driver, was charged with supervision of the plaintiff. A government
vehicle driven by another federal employee acting within the scope of
his employment rounded a corner and collided with the vehicle upon
which the plaintiff was riding. Apparently it was not disputed that
the injuries which resulted from the collision were caused by the negli-
gence of one of the drivers. In allowing relief under the act, the court
reasoned:
While it is rational to conclude that in the sphere of private indi-
viduals there is no equivalent of the jailer-prisoner relationship, it is
running a good principle into the ground to declare in terms of a cate-
gorical imperative that a federal prisoner, by virtue of his status alone,
may not sue the United States under the provisions of the Federal
Tort Claims Act where his claim is based upon the alleged negligence
of a federal employee completely disassociated from his status. Com-
pare Panella v. United States, 2 Cir., 1954, 216 F.2d 622, wherein the
question was left open. Nothing in the rationale or the holding of Feres
v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152, conceding
that its vitality as an analogy to federal prisoner cases under the Tort
Claims Act has not been impaired by Rayonier, Inc. v. United States,
352 U.S. 315, 77 S.Ct. 374, 1 L.Ed.2d 354, or Indian Towing Co., Inc.
v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48, sanctions
such a rule cast in absolute terms.4"
From this survey, it seems safe to surmise that denial of relief is the
expectable result in future district or circuit court decisions, except per-
haps, in any which like the Lawrence case, involve an injury sustained
40 Berman v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 107 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
•11 193 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Ala. 1961).
42 Id. at 245.
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in a manner totally unrelated to the injured person's status as a pris-
oner. The question remains as to what the Supreme Court will decide.
BACKGROUND OF THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
Modernly, it is accepted without question that the federal and state
governments may not be sued by their citizens unless the government
has given its consent. This concept was inherited from English com-
mon law, although it also existed in continental law and, more anciently,
Roman law. In England, the basis for this doctrine lay in the peculiar
nature of the Crown. In the first place, feudalism precluded suits by
subjects against their lord or king for the very practical reason that it
was impossible for a person to be a party to an action in a court which
he was conducting." In the second place, jurisprudence of the Middle
Ages, influenced by ecclesiastic doctrines, advanced the theory of the
"divine right of Kings" according to which kings owed no duty to the
laws of man but only to the laws of God. 4 From this theory arose the
often repeated maxim, "the King can do no wrong." Although conten-
tion continued whether the correct basis of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity was the result of feudalism or the theory of the "divine right
of Kings," or both, it became well settled by Blackstone's time that the
Crown was immune from suit for torts committed personally or by
an agent of the Crown.4" This principle persisted in England without
substantial change until the enactment of the Crown Proceedings Act
of 1947, culminating a centuries-old battle to restrict or abolish the
doctrine."
A similar trend advocating relief for injuries caused by the tortious
conduct of persons in their capacity as governmental agents had been
taking place elsewhere in the world. Several countries of the Common-
wealth preceded England in providing relief." In Germany, the trend
evolved to the point that the scope of governmental liability became
greater for governmental than for non-governmental acts (or, as they
are characterized in Germany, "corporate acts")."' French judispru-
dence advanced to the extreme of allowing governmental responsibility
43 STREET, GoVERNwENTAL LIABUmrry 1 (1953).
44 Blachly and Oatman, Approaches to Governmental Liability in Tort: A Com-
parative Survey, 9 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 181, 182 (1942).45 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmS 242 (17th ed. 1830).
46 Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 44.4 7 Australia provided for relief against the Government at the turn of the century,
Australia Constitutional Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict. c. 12, 78; the Union of South Africa
in 1910, Crown Liabilities Act, 1910, § 2; and Canada in 1927, Canadian Petition of
Right Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c. 158 (1927). Subsequently, New Zealand has caused the
Crown to be suable in tort under its Crown Proceedings Act, Act No. 54 of 1950, § 6.
48 STRa.Er, op. cit. supra note 43, at 20.
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with the only exception being actions for injuries resulting from gov-
ernmental functions, using that term in its most limited sense. 9
The English concept of the doctrine of sovereign immunity at the
time of the adoption of the United States Constitution was arrogated
by the federal courts into the United States common law, notwithstand-
ing the same reasons for its adoption did not exist." Through the years,
little authority existed to point out the true basis for the doctrine in
the United States, since the courts proceeded no further than to repeat
the doctrine, and, aside from passing some private relief bills, Congress
did not express its views until 1946. The passage of these private bills
accords with the doctrine that the Government cannot be sued without
its consent but does not aid in ascertaining the substance and limita-
tions of the doctrine. Considerable variance of opinion exists concern-
ing the proper basis for the doctrine and whether it ought to continue
as a part of American jurisprudence. Discontent with the doctrine
grew, evidenced by a large body of writing on the subject. Most of
this writing seeks in various ways to point out that the doctrine can-
not validly be characterized as substantive law; but rather, the doc-
trine only identifies the procedural predicament that no method has
been provided for bringing an action against the Government for torts
committed by its agents. One of the functions of government is to pro-
vide the mechanics of redress, and until the United States has provided
a means of redress against itself, no such action can be brought.
Against this background, the first of a series of bills was introduced
into Congress in 1942, culminating in the passage of the Federal Tort
Claims Act in 1946."' Application of the act by the federal courts has
not always been consistent and some of the trends originating soon
after its passage apparently have already been changed." Some of the
fundamental rules of the act have yet to be developed. Whether a fed-
eral prisoner may recover under the act for injuries caused by the neg-
ligent or wrongful act or omission of a federal employee while he is in
a federal prison must await a decision by the United States Supreme
Court. Meanwhile, the lower federal courts will most probably con-
tinue to deny relief on the basis of arguments patterned after those
49 See STREET, Op. cit. supra note 43, at 56-76.
50 The practical problem in feudalism which prevented the lord from being sued in
his own court does not exist modernly, nor does the theory of the "divine right of
Kings" bear any weight. However, rationale for the doctrine in our law has one or
the other of these theories as its origin, which can be detected in opinions such as Jus-
tice Holmes' in Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
51 The basic provisions of the act are now found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80(1958).
52 E.g., from the Dalehite case to the Indian Towing Co. and Rayonier cases.
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presented by thoroughly capable defense-minded government attor-
neys and which appear in the existing cases.53
ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEm
Recovery by prisoners for injuries sustained while in federal prisons
is not precluded by any of the express exceptions from coverage of the
act.5 This factor has particular significance in the case of the Federal
Tort Claims Act. The purpose of the act, at least in part, was to re-
lieve Congress of the onerous task of providing relief against the Gov-
ernment by means of private relief bills. Prior to the passage of the
act, Congress had provided relief in this manner to federal prisoners
on several occasions," which indicates a congressional awareness of the
need. Congress expressed itself in detail, in itemizing definite types of
claims to be precluded from coverage of the act. Claims of federal
prisoners fall in none of these, which, by application of the maxim
expressio unius, raises the inference that Congress did not intend to
preclude these claims.5 The question remains, however, whether Con-
gress intended that federal prisoners should be allowed to recover un-
der the act. Again, the act is not specific regarding claims of federal
prisoners. However, the act does not provide relief for any particular
type of claim. The requirement in the act is merely that the claimant
must have been injured by a "negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if
a private person, would be liable to the claimant"'. . . [and that] the
United States shall be liable ... in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances. . . ."'I This
merely constitutes a statement of general policy, to which specific ex-
ceptions were listed. Congress clearly was not attempting to direct the
outcome of specific types of actions.
Since nothing specific can be found in the act regarding recovery by
federal prisoners, resort must be had to the statutory interpretation
8 Lack v. United States, 262 F2d 167 (8th Cir. 1958); Jones v. United States,
249 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1957) ; Berman v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 107 (E.D.N.Y.
1959) ; Van Zuch v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) ; Shew v. United
States, 116 F. Supp. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1953) ; Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906
(W.D. Va. 1953).
5428 U.S.C. § 2680 (1958).
55 Brief for Appellee, Lack v. United States, 262 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1958), according
to WRIGHT, THE FEDRn.L TORT CLAImS AcT 34 (1959 Supp.).
16 WRIGHT, THE FEDmAL TORT CLAIMs AcT 31 (1959 Supp.) ; Note, 63 YALE L.J.
418 (1954).
5728 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
5828 U.S.C. §2674 (1958).
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process. In doing this, it is wise first to observe that courts employ
different techniques of statutory interpretation when a statute is de-
tailed, specific, and mechanically applicable, than when it is of a gen-
eral nature, the limits of which are governed by broad, vague standards.
In applying the former type of statute, the judicial function is largely
limited to characterizing the problems presented by the facts and pro-
jecting the statute upon these problems-a mechanical function devoid
of what is often referred to as "judicial legislation." In applying the
latter type of a statute, the generality of the statute causes the courts
to perform a different function. Essentially, the courts make policy de-
cisions here, or engage in "judicial legislation," when interpreting these
statutes. Usually the courts say they are doing something else, how-
ever, because the attitude prevails in American jurisprudence that pol-
icy decisions represent a legislative function which may not and should
not be performed by other bodies of government because of the doc-
trine of separation of powers.
Performance of this "legislative" function by the courts should not
be considered contrary to American jurisprudence. Delegation of Con-
gress' rule-making power to executive agencies, subject to limitations,
is accepted as a necessary means of reducing the work-load of Congress
in a period of increasing volume and complexity of legislative func-
tions. 9 Private bills for the relief of persons injured due to the neg-
ligence of government employees under circumstances in which the
Government should be responsible became so voluminous that Con-
gress had to delegate this function to another body. In so doing, Con-
gress had to decide how much of the decision making function, with
respect to determining the category of claimants who should be allowed
to recover under the act, should be delegated. Should Congress specify
the types of claims and categories of claimants in detail, thus delegat-
ing only the function of deciding the merits of the individual cases?
If Congress had decided to take this course, it most probably would
have constructed a detailed and specific statute. A contrary and gen-
eralized construction of the act was utilized instead, showing an intent
by Congress to delegate to the federal courts the more "legislative"
function of determining what claims and claimants the act should bene-
fit, subject only to the guide lines set forth in sections 1346(b) and
2674 and the specific exclusions in section 2680 of the act.
In determining what claims and claimants should benefit by the act,
59 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940). See also DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 2.01- 2.16 (1959).
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the federal courts will have to make some basic inquiries concerning
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Reasons for retaining sovereign
immunity must be weighed against the reasons for abrogating it to the
extent allowed by the act, and the answer should reflect the general
tenor of the act.
A variety of jurisprudential reasons for continuing the doctrine of
sovereign immunity has been suggested. A fair representation of these
reasons has been compiled by Harper and James:6"
(1) funds devoted to public purposes should not be diverted to com-
pensate for private injuries; (2) "the public service would be hindered,
and the public safety endangered, if the superior authority could be
subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen, and, consequently,
controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the
proper administration of the Government"; (3) that liability would
involve the government "in all its operations, in endless embarrass-
ments, and difficulties, and losses, which would be subversive of the
public interests"; and (4) that unlike private enterprises, the govern-
ment derives no profit from its activities.
On the other hand, the general tenor of the act shows a congressional
desire for liberal interpretation and application of the act. The general
tenor, rather than the "dictionary interpretation" of the act is the
crucial thing in determining its meaning and purpose. When Congress
constructs a statute in which courts are given certain powers, and the
scope of these powers are limited by broad, general terms, the courts
must look to the general tenor of the statute in deciding particular
cases. Judge Hand has stated, "statutes always have some purpose or
object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is
the surest guide to their meaning."'"
In discussing the problem of statutory interpretation, Judge Frank
compared the function of statutory interpretation with the work of a
musician interpreting a musical score.62 Some composers include pre-
cise directions concerning the execution of every portion of their com-
position. This music will sound very much the same regardless of who
is conducting its performance. Other composers' directions will be
merely something like "play this with tenderness," or "play this with
602 HARPER & JAims, ToRTs § 29.3 (1956), quoting in (2), The Siren, 7 U.S.
(Wall.) 152, 154 (1868), and quoting in (3), Murdock Parlor Grate Co. v. Common-
wealth, 152 Mass. 28, 32, 24 N.E. 854, 856 (1890), quoting SToRY, AGENCY § 319 (9th
ed. 1882).
01Frank, Words And Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47
CoLum. L. Rxv. 1259, 1263 (1947), quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d
Cir. 1945).62 Frank, supra note 61.
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determination." 6 Judge Frank's theory is that when Congress desires
"judicial legislation," it will construct a statute with general and vague
standards which would be, in effect, a direction to the courts to "play
this statute with tenderness" or "play that statute with determina-
tion."" According to this theory, it would appear Congress directed
the federal courts to apply the Federal Tort Claims Act with liberality,
and the federal courts should give effect to the mandate to restrict the
application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in determining who
may recover under the act and upon what claims.
If the act is construed and applied with liberality, federal prisoners
should be able to recover for injuries sustained by a negligent or wrong-
ful act or omission of a government employee acting within the scope
of his employment while the prisoner was in a federal prison. Since the
Feres and Dalehite cases, which appeared for some time to be the be-
ginning of a trend toward a conservative application of the act, the
United States Supreme Court, through the Indian Towing Co. and
Rayonier cases, has shown a definite intent to construe and apply the
act with liberality.6" If this trend toward liberality is forcibly presented
to the lower federal courts, then different results might be expected
because these courts traditionally attempt to "follow new 'doctrinal
trends' in the court above them." 6
A liberal construction of the act would be beneficial to the public as
a whole. The argument that public funds should not be used to com-
pensate private injuries" is rebutted by pointing out the resulting un-
fairness to a person who is injured due to the fault of another and yet
has to bear his or her own loss. "[S]ince the public purposes involve
injury producing activity, the injuries thus caused should be viewed
as a part of the activity's normal costs, and no one suggests that it is
a diversion of public funds to pay to [sic] cost of public enterprise even
11 Id. at 1267.
64. Ibid.
65 The majority of the present Court appears to favor a liberal interpretation of the
act. Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Harlan joined in the majority
opinions in both the Indian Towing Co. and Rayonier cases. Mr. Justice Black joined
the majority in the Indian Towing Co. case, and wrote the majority opinion in the
Rayonier case. Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined the dissent in the Dalehite case, wrote
the majority opinion in the Indian Towing Co. case, and joined the majority in the
Rayonier case. Mr. Justice Clark, on the other hand, has shown apparent sympathy
with a conservative construction of the act by joining the dissent in both the Indian
Towing Co. and Rayonier cases. Even with the positions of Justices Whittaker and
Stewart being unpredictable at this time, a liberal construction of the act appears to
be the expectable result in the future.
66 Frank, supra note 61, at 1271.
67 2 HARmER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 60.
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if payment is made to private persons.""8 Presumably, we consider it
fundamental to our system of government that all people join in pay-
ing the costs of government, and yet a cost involved in an injury to a
federal prisoner caused by the Government through the negligence of
one of its agents will currently have to be born by the injured party
alone. Further, the present situation is inconsistent with current theol-
ries of treatment of criminals. Federal prisoners are deprived of many
rights because of their failure to conform to certain social requirements
but nothing indicates that Congress intended them to withstand all risks
of harm. No comparable deprivation of the right to be treated with
the care which an ordinary prudent man would exercise under the
circumstances 9 exists regarding prisoners in state prisons.
There is a sufficient number of federal prisoners to warrant concern.
The average number of federal prisoners in Bureau of Prison Institu-
tions for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1959, was twenty-one thou-
sand, eight hundred and ninety-one."0 At present there is no adequate
system of compensation for injured federal prisoners. A compensation
statute exists to provide relief for prisoners injured while working for
the Federal Prison Industries,7' but this is inadequate for those af-
fected, and these prisoners do not represent the majority of the prison
population. According to the Bureau of Prisons report of 1956,72 only
about eighteen per cent of the total number of federal prisoners were
engaged in the Federal Prison Industries while about forty per cent
were engaged in prison maintenance, which is not substantially less
hazardous work. Even for the eighteen per cent of prisoners covered
by this "workmen's compensation" statute," the compensation pro-
vided is inadequate because the "compensation may not exceed the
amount that would be paid under the Federal Employees' Compensa-
tion Act. Although the Federal Employees' Compensation Act is a
liberal workmen's compensation act, the benefits under it are based
on the worker's pay at the time of the injury which, in the case of
prisoners, is notoriously low."7' These statistics show a real need to
68 Id. at 1612. Contrary to popular belief, allowing federal prisoners to recover un-
der the act would not cause a great drain on the federal treasury. The effect of New
York's position is a good example. According to one report, from 1955 to 1958, only
five judgments in favor of state prisoners were rendered in New York under its tort
claim statute. Comment, Remedies Available to Penal Inmates for Injuries Received
While Incarcerated, 34 IND. L.J. 609, 620 n. 84 (1959).69 PRossmR, TORTS § 31 (1955) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 283 (1934).
70 1959 BtuRAu oF PRISONS ANN. REP.
71 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1958).
72 1956 BUREAU OF PRIsoNs ANN. REP.
7318 U.S.C. § 4126 (1958).
74 WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 56, at 29, citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 751-95.
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provide relief for injured federal prisoners, and nothing in the general
tenor of the act, or in the circumstances attending its enactment, evince
a congressional desire for the courts to deny relief to federal prisoners.
Government attorneys have argued" that the special statutory relief
provided for prisoners injured while working in the Federal Prison
Industries 8 is the exclusive remedy against the United States for those
claimants. A forceable argument can be made against this by indicat-
ing that some other federal compensation statutes, such as the Vet-
eran's Act," have been construed as non-exclusive, and a subsequent
recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act would merely be reduced
by the recovery under the other statute." Compensation statutes
which have been construed to be exclusive, such as the Federal Em-
ployees' Compensation Act," are not analogous. Contrary to the stat-
ute providing compensation for federal prisoners injured while work-
ing in the Federal Prison Industries,"° these statutes deal with large
classes of persons rather than segments of a more distinct group,"
which evinces a congressional desire that they be exclusive remedies.
Another argument which might have to be overcome by a federal
prisoner's attorney is that the relationship between a jailer and his
prisoners precludes the existence of a duty on the part of the jailer
to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent man; 82 to impose such a
duty would unduly interfere with prison discipline. The basis for this
argument is that the jailer's job of keeping people restricted is so
hazardous and requires so much discipline that he should not be ex-
pected to exercise the care which would be required under different
circumstances. This is really nothing more than a plea for a different
standard of care for jailers. Since the circumstances control the stand-
ard of care, of course a jailer would not properly be expected to
exercise the same care in some functions as he would in other situa-
76 Berman v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 107 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); Lack v. United
States, 262 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1958) ; Jones v. United States, 249 F.2d 864 (7th Cir.
1957) ; Van Zuch v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) ; Shew v. United
States, 116 F. Supp. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1953) ; Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906
(W.D. Va. 1953).
7 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1958).
77 38 U.S.C. §§ 701-88 (1958).
78 United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954) ; Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S.
49 (1949).
79 5 U.S.C. §§ 751-95 (1958).80 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1958).
81 The Veteran's Act, though encompassing a large and distinct group of persons,
was of a nature which would infer that Congress intended liberal benevolence toward
veterans, which is not found in the normal workmen's compensation statute.
82 This is the standard of conduct by which negligence is determined. PROSSER, Op.
cit. supra note 69; RESTATEMENT, TORTS, mnipra note 69.
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tions, such as if he were a hotel manager. Nevertheless, he would have
to exercise the care required of a reasonably prudent jailer under the
same or similar circumstances.
It is significant that the majority of the states which have passed
upon the question have granted prisoners recovery against jailers for
injuries caused by the jailers' negligence., Assume that a trustee-
prisoner of a state prison were injured while delivering, state prison-
farm produce to a federal prison within that state, and the injury was
caused by the negligence of a guard at the federal prison while acting
within the scope of his employment. Assume further that the law of
that state permits prisoners to recover against jailers on the theory
of negligence. Would this state prisoner be able to recover under the
act? It would seem so. Then why should a federal prisoner who is
injured under similar facts be precluded from recovery? If a state
prisoner could recover from his jailer for a negligently caused injury
in that state, a federal prisoner should be granted relief under the act,
83 States which allow recovery: California, Fernelius v. Pierce, 22 Cal. 2d 226, 138
P.2d 12 (1943) ; Colorado, People ex rel. Coover v. Guthner, 105 Colo. 37, 94 P.2d 699(1939) ; Georgia, Kendrick v. Adamson, 51 Ga. App. 402, 180 S.E. 647 (1935) ; Idaho,
Jacobson v. McMillan, 64 Ida. 351, 132 P.2d 773 (1943) (Idaho has not decided the
question directly but has cited the Washington position with approval); Indiana,
Magenheimer v. State, 120 Ind. App. 128, 90 N.E.2d 813 (1950) ; In re Jenkins, 25 Ind.
App. 532, 58 N.E. 560 (1900); Iowa, Smith v. Miller, 241 Ia. 625, 40 N.W.2d 567
(1950) ; Kansas, Bukaty v. Berglund, 179 Kan. 259, 294 P.2d 228 (1956) ; Topeka v.
Boutwell, 53 Kan. 20, 35 Pac. 819 (1894) ; Kentucky, Lamb v. Clark, 282 Ky. 167, 138
S.W.2d 350 (1940) ; Ratliff v. Stanley, 224 Ky. 819, 7 S.W,2d 230 (1928) ; Louisiana,
St. Julien v. State, 98 So. 2d 284 (La. App. 1957) ; Honeycutt v. Bass, 187 So. 848 (La.
App. 1939); Mississippi, Farmer v. State, 224 Miss. 96, 79 So. 2d 528 (1955); Missouri,
Nixa v. McMullin, 198 Mo. App. 1, 193 S.W. 596 (1917) (this case but weakly sup-
ports this position); Nebraska, O'Dell v. Goodsell, 149 Neb. 261, 30 N.W 2d 906
(1948); Nevada, Gurley v. Brown, 65 Nev. 245, 193 P.2d 693 (1948) (dicta); New
York, Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E. 2d 534 (1958).; North
Carolina, State ex re. Hayes v. Billings, 240 N.C. 78, 81 S.E.2d 150 (1954); Ohio,
Justice v. Rose, 102 Ohio App. 482, 144 N.E.2d 303 (1957); Oklahoma, Allen v. Cavin,
179 Okl. 460, 66 P.2d 40 (1937); Taylor v. Slaughter, 171 Okl. 152, 42 P.2d 235
(1935); Hixon v. Cupp, 5 Ol. 545, 49 Pac. 927 (1893); Tennessee, State ex rel.
Morris v. Nat'l Surety Co., 162 Tenn. 547, 39 S.W.2d 581 (1937) ; Texas, Browning
v. Graves, 152 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) ; Asher v. Cabell, 50 Fed. 818 (1892) ;
Utah, Richardson v. Capwell, 63 Utah 616, 176 Pac. 205 (1918) (dicta); Virginia,
Dabney v. Talioferro, 4 Rand. 256 (1826); Washington, Eberhart v. Murphy, 113
Wash. 449, 194 Pac. 415 (1920) ; Kusah v. McCorkle, 100 Wash. 318, 170 Pac. 1023(1918) ; Riggs v. German, 81 Wash. 128, 142 Pac. 479 (1914) ; West Virginia, Smith
v. Slack 125 W Va. 812, 26 S.E.2d 387 (1943). Note that some of these states based
liability on statutes, but no distinction should be drawn on this point because most of
these statutes were enacted at a time when the mistaken opinion that jailers and sher-
iffs had no standard of care toward prisoners, save "wanton misconduct," was prevalent.
States which deny recovery: Illinois, Bush v. Babb, 23 Ill. App.2d 285, 162 N.E.2d
594 (1959) ; Maryland, Cocking v. Wade, 87 Md. 529, 40 Atl. 104 (1898) ; Clark v.
Ferling, 220 Md. 109, 151 A.2d 137 (1959); Massachusetts, O'Hare v. Jones, 161
Mass. 391, 37 N.E. 371 (1894).
In federal actions, the limitation expressed in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d '579 (2d
Cir. 1949), would exist.
For a general discussion in this area, see Remedies Available To Penal Inmates For
Injuries Received Whtile Incarcerated, 34 I1N. L.J. 609 (1959).
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since the act expressly provides that liability of the United States is
to be based upon local law. 4
In the State of Washington, it will be interesting to see whether the
recently enacted statute,8 waiving the state's immunity from suit in
actions for damages arising out of its tortious conduct, will receive a
liberal construction by the Washington Supreme Court. A liberal con-
struction should result in recoveries by state prisoners since Washing-
ton numbers among those states which recognize that jailers and other
custodians of prisoners owe some duty of care toward their prisoners.88
If this comes to pass, a disparity between the judicial application of
8428 U.S.C. §1346(b) (1958). See Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857 (1955).
86 Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 136.
86 However, there is a substantial danger that chapter 136 will not provide relief for
state prisoners against the State of Washington for injuries sustained due to the negli-
gent conduct of a state agent or employee acting within the scope of his employment
while the prisoner is incarcerated in one of the state prisons.
First, recovery may be denied because chapter 136 did not cause the State of Wash-
ington to be liable for damages resulting from its tortious conduct. The argument would
be that for recovery to be allowed, the legislature must enact a statute which provides
for state liability for torts of its agents and employees, and that a statute which merely
provides "any person or corporation having any claim against the State of Washington
shall have the right to begin an action against the state" (RCW 4.92.010), or "the
state of Washington... hereby consents to the maintaining of a suit or action against
it for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a
private person or corporation" (chapter 136), does not accomplish this purpose. In
support of the argument that a consent to liability by the state is necessary as well as
a consent to suit, to effect a waiver of sovereign immunity, the proponent may cite
Billings v. State, 27 Wash. 288, 67 Pac. 583 (1902) ; Riddoch v. State, 68 Wash. 329,
123 Pac. 450 (1912) ; Cook v. State, 192 Wash. 602, 74 P.2d 199 (1937) ; Automobile
Club of Washington v. Seattle, 55 Wn.2d 161, 346 P.2d 695 (1959). The conclusion
advanced would be that since chapter 136 does not contain the word "liability," it does
not waive the state's sovereign immunity from suits based upon tort principles.
The effect of this argument awaits judicial interpretation. It ought not be embraced
by the Washington court since the notion that the legislature must consent to "liability"
as well as to suit to effect a waiver of its sovereign immunity is without historical foun-
dation in the evolution of the doctrine. Further, the statute should be given a liberal
construction since it is remedial. Johnson v. Ottomeier, 45 Wn.2d 419, 275 P2d 723
(1954).
State prisoners may face another hurdle in attempting to obtain relief under chapter
136. It may be impossible to satisfy any judgment obtained under the statute out of the
state treasury. No special appropriation attended the statute. Therefore, since the
Washington Constitution, art. VIII, § 4 (amendment 11) (1922), prohibits paying any
money out of the state treasury except pursuant to an appropriation, funds may be un-
available to pay a judgment. However, if any appropriation, made to fund other mat-
ters covered by some other statute, is sufficiently broad to permit payment of money
to satisfy a judgment obtained by a state prisoner under chapter 136, this would cause
no problem. Another possible but less probable solution is that a technique may be
devised by some ingenious counsel for attaching money in one of the local funds of
which the state treasurer is the custodian only. Unless this solution is available, the
local funds will be beyond the grasp of a judgment creditor who has recovered under
chapter 136, since there is no method at this time for such a person to compel the state
treasurer to issue a warrant on these funds.
Finally, there is the danger that the Washington Supreme Court may adopt the rea-
soning of those federal cases which deny relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act to
federal prisoners. To prevent this, the error in the federal position must be vigorously
and accurately exposed.
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the Washington act and the Federal Tort Claims Act would be vividly
illustrated.
The phrase in the act which provides for United States. liability
"where the United States, if a private person, would be liable"8 ' places
the United States in the position of its prison guards and employees for
purposes of ascertaining liability on the part of the United States. Yet
Government attorneys argue that Congress could not have intended
that the "federal" relationship of a federal prisoner to the Government
should be in any way governed by the varying laws of the states. The
tenor of this argument is appealing under the receptive light of the
contemporaneous trend toward exclusive federal activities. However,
it ignores the fact that the act, which causes state law to apply, was
intended by Congress to apply to the vast majority of governmental
activities, thus making many federal activities dependent upon state
law. It does not appear that the Supreme Court has been impressed
with this argument in other situations, however. In any event, no real
burden would be placed upon the federal prison system. Of the states
which recognize that a jailer or other custodian of prisoners owes a
duty of care toward his prisoners, the standard would probably vary
little between the states. The only difference would be between those
prisons in states which do recognize the existence of this duty of care,
and those which do not. However, little difference in treatment should
be expected between these two groups of prisons, since we should be
able to assume that the present care in federal prisons is uniformly
humane.
Another factor which federal courts will have to consider in deter-
mining whether federal prisoners may recover under the act is that one
purpose of the act was to relieve Congress of the onerous function of
providing relief for persons who theretofore could not recover for in-
juries sustained because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The
brief of the Government in the Lack case88 calls attention to twenty-
four private bills introduced into Congress to relieve federal prisoners.
These bills were introduced before and after the act was passed.89 This
suggests not only that Congress was aware of the need for relief before
it enacted the act, but also that the purpose of the act is not being
satisfied. 0 The Lack opinion discloses a report of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary concerning a private bill for relief of a federal
8728 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
88 Lack v. United States, 262 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1958).
8 9 WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 56, at 31.
00 Ibid.
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prisoner which was introduced after the passage of the act. This re-
port states that because the claimant could not recover under the act,
he could receive compensation by private legislation. The court in the
Lack case deduced that this report constituted a congressional state-
ment that at the time of the passage of the act, it had not intended it
to provide relief to federal prisoners." This deduction does not neces-
sarily follow. It appears from the report that the committee's conclu-
sion was based upon the Van Zuch and Sigmon decisions. Therefore,
an equally valid deduction from the report is that since the Van Zuch
and Sigmon decisions indicated to Congress that the federal courts
were declining to relieve Congress of its burden of providing relief to
injured federal prisoners, which was one of the purposes of the act,
then Congress would have to take up the burdensome practice again.
Perhaps if Congress were to become besieged with requests for
private bills to compensate federal prisoners for injuries sustained while
incarcerated, a definitive legislative statement, correcting or affirming
the federal courts' present position, might ensue.
CONCLUSION
Neither the Federal Tort Claims Act nor the Feres case presents a
bar to a federal prisoner's action under the Federal Tort Claims Act
for injuries sustained due to a negligent or wrongful act or omission of
a federal employee acting within the scope of his employment. The
reasoning of the Feres case which may have survived the trend caused
by the Indian Towing Co. and Rayonier cases is not properly applic-
able to a federal prisoner case. Recovery by a federal prisoner was
not expressly precluded by the act, and allowance of recovery would
accord with the general tenor of the act. The trend of a liberal con-
struction and application of the act, evidenced in part by the Indian
Towing Co. and Rayonier cases, dictates that the lower federal courts
should allow relief to the federal prisoner. The number of federal
prisoners is large enough to create serious problems unless there is a
comprehensive and adequate system of compensation for injuries sus-
tained due to the fault of the Government's employees. Allowing re-
covery would terminate the injustice of a single individual's having to
bear the entire cost of a certain cost of government-his injury. Al-
lowing recovery would also cause the law of the place where the pris-
oner was injured to govern the standard of care owed to him by those
91 Lack v. United States, 262 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1958).
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to whose charge he has been commended. Finally, Congress would be
relieved of the time-consuming function of determining the merits of
each claimant in a period replete with more momentous problems.
Notwithstanding this reasoning, injured federal prisoners will prob-
ably not receive favorable treatment in federal courts. Perhaps the
Lawrence case will provide an impetus for granting recovery under the
act, at least in cases where the injury is sustained under circumstances
quite unrelated to the person's status as a prisoner. Until the Supreme
Court considers the matter, however, denial of recovery will be the
expectable result in the lower federal courts. Meanwhile, probably
very few actions will be commenced by federal prisoners because of
the twenty per cent maximum attorney's fee limitation set by the act
and because the prospect of a denial of recovery at the trial and ap-
pellate levels will indicate a poor return to the attorney for his work
in the ordinary case.
